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CORROBORATION OF INFANT'S TESTIMONY IN SEX
CRIMES
State v. Porcaro
6 N.Y.2d 248, 160 N.E.2d 488 (1959)
Defendant was indicted for first degree sodomy, second degree assault
and impairing the morals of a minor, his ten year old stepdaughter. The
child's sworn testimony of regular sexual intercourse, both in the usual
manner and orally, for the previous four years was uncorroborated by other
evidence. The jury convicted defendant of impairing the morals of a minor.'
Timely and repeated demands by the defendant for a physical examination
of the prosecutrix were refused. The trial court entered judgment on the
verdict convicting defendant of impairing the morals of a minor which the
appellate division of the supreme court affirmed.2  The court of appeals
reversed by a 4-3 decision on the ground that the sworn testimony of the
alleged victim was insufficient to sustain conviction, especially in the absence
of findings from a physical examination. 3 The court in recognizing the policy
behind an express statutory provision requiring corroboration of the unsworn
testimony of a minor in any criminal case,4 preferred to rely on the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence in the case rather than to construct a rule requiring
corroboration of an infant's sworn testimony in sex crimes.5
At common law, the testimony of the injured person in a sex offense
was alone sufficient to sustain a conviction, corroboration was not required6
and the rule remains the same today unless changed by statute.7 The rule
1 N.Y. Pen. Law § 483(2) "A person who wilfully causes or permits such child
(actually or apparently under the age of sixteen) to be placed in such a situation ...
(where) .. .its morals (are) likely to be impaired is guilty of a misdemeanor."
2 6 App. Div. 2d 680, 174 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1958).
3 People v. Porcaro 6 N.Y.2d 248, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194, 160 N.E.2d 488 (1959).
4 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 392. Rules of Evidence; Evidence of Certain Children,
How Received . . . ". . .Whenever in any criminal proceedings, a child actually or
apparently under the age of twelve years, does not in the opinion of the court . . .
understand the nature of the oath, the evidence of such child may be received though
not given under oath .... But no person shall be held or convicted of an offense upon
such testimony unsupported by other evidence."
G See Fuld, J. concurring opinion in State v. Porcaro (supra note 3) which argues
for a rule requiring corroboration in sex crimes.
6 Boddie v. State, 52 Ala. 395 (1875); State v. Ellison, 19 N.M. 428, 144 Pac. 10
(1914); 7 Wigmore, "Evidence" § 2061 (3d ed. 1940); 20 Am. Jur. "Evidence" § 1222
(1939); and extensive annotation in Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1124 (1929). Contra, State v.
Bowher, 40 Idaho 74, 231 Pac. 706 (1924); Matthews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 27 N.W.
234 (1886) ; see also infra note 13.
7 See for example, N.Y. Pen. Law § 71 (abduction), § 103 (adultery), § 1091
(compulsory prostitution of wife), § 1455 (compulsory marriage), § 2013 (rape), § 2177
(seduction), § 2460 (compulsory prostitution). Compare with above for a different
statutory treatment, Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.63 concerning seduction under promise of
marriage or seduction by a teacher, which provides that ". .. a conviction shall not be
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applies to all sex offenses including rape,8 statutory rape,9 seduction,10
bastardy," and incest.' 2 However, some courts require the testimony to be
"clear and convincing"' 13 or else be corroborated; and others, remembering
the admonition of Lord Chief Justice Hale that rape "is an accusation
easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho never so innocent,"'14 reverse convictions of sex crimes
regularly when there is no corroboration of sworn testimony, but rely on the
ground that the "evidence is insufficient to sustatin the finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."'I5
The principal case, State v. Porcaro, was decided the same day as
People v. Oyola,16 a very similar case; and both decisions noted the absence
of corroboration of the prosecutrix's sworn testimony. The importance of
both decisions is that they did not establish a technical rule of law requiring
corroboration in infant sex crimes, but rather relied in the opinions on the
rule that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Judge Fuld in his concurring opinion wished to make an
explicit rule always requiring corroboration in sex offenses, 17 but Van
Voorhis J., Conway C. J., and Froessel J., refused to do this. A technical
rule of corroboration is justly criticized by Wigmore as a "crude and childish"
measure18 and completely inadequate to safeguard the defendants who are
victims of fraudulent complaints. The court is to be commended for their
due caution in refusing to allow the conviction to stand, yet steering care-
fully away from an artificial rule which obstructs justice in a clear case. A
safer protection for defendants is Wigmore's suggestion' 9 of a required psy-
chiatric examination of the female complainant in a sexual crime at the
had on the testimony of such female, unsupported by other evidence. . . ."; however,
no other requirement of corroboration by statute or decision exists in sex crimes. 15
Ohio Jur. 2d "Criminal Law" § 463-5 (1955); 28 Ohio Jur. 2d "Incest" § 13 (1958); 10
Ohio Jur. 2d "Abortion" § 17 (1954). Collection of statutes in Wigmore as cited in supra
note 6 at 346 et seq.
8 Boddie v. State, supra note 6; People v. Keith, 141 Cal. 686, 75 Pac. 304 (1904).
9 Lear v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 187, 77 S.E.2d 424 (1953).
I' State v. Seller, 106 Wis. 346, 82 N.W. 167 (1900).
11 McGuire v. State, 84 Ariz. 342, 326 P.2d 362 (1958).
12 People v. Gibson, 301 N.Y. 244, 93 N.E.2d 827 (1950). For comprehensive listing
of cases see citations to Wigmore and A.L.R. supra note 6.
13 People v. O'Conner, 412 Ill. 304, 106 N.E.2d 176 (1952), Brown v. State, 127
Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906).
14 L.C.J. Hale, 1 Pleas of The Crown 633, 635 (1680).
15 New York is an excellent example of this in the following cases, all of which were
rendered without opinion and reversed convictions of various sex crimes against minors.
People v. Myers, 309 N.Y. 837, 130 N.E.2d 622 (1955); People v. Rosen, 293 N.Y. 683,
56 N.E.2d 297 (1944); People v. Derner, 288 N.Y. 599, 42 N.E.2d 605 (1942); People
v. Slaughter, 278 N.Y. 479, 15 N.E.2d 297 (1938).
16 6 N.Y.2d 259, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203, 160 N.E.2d 494 (1959).
17 160 N.E.2d 488, 490.
18 7 Wigmore, "Evidence" § 2061 (3d ed. 1940).
19 3 Wigmore, "Evidence" § 924a (3d ed. 1940).
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request of the defendant. Numerous medical authorities20 and other writers21
have advocated this because they "know how frequently sexual assault
is charged or claimed with nothing more substantial supporting the belief
than an unrealized wish or unconscious, deeply suppressed sex-longing or
thwarting."22 Decidedly, statutory treatment is needed for a mandatory psy-
chiatric examination of complainants in sex offenses. This is especially true
in cases like the principal one, where the credibility of the prosecutrix is
questionable because of her age and immaturity. A recent Indiana case,23
illustrates the necessity of a statute by affirming a conviction of assault and
battery on no other evidence than the uncorroborated testimony of an
admitted perjurer, and holding that the court had no power to require a
prosecutrix to submit to a physical or psychiatric examination.
James R. Miles
20 See citations in Wigmore above.
21 1937-38 A.BA. Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence as cited
in Wigmore above; McKinney, "Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination as Proposed Means
for Testing the Complainant's Competency to Allege a Sex Offense," 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 651.
22 Dr. W. F. Lorenz as reported in 3 Wigmore, supra note 19, at 465.
23 Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).

